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Abstract
This paper characterizes mechanisms satisfying Bayesian incentive com-
patibility (BIC) and interim individual rationality (IIR) in the classical public
good provision problem. Many papers in the literature obtain the results in
the so-called standard model of ex ante identical agents with a continuous,
closed interval of types. Although the standard model and more generally a
continuum type space are widely used in the literature, it is nonetheless an
abstraction of reality. Given that the public good provision problem has oc-
cupied a central application in the theory of mechanism design, we propose
a “stress test” for the results in the standard model by subjecting them to a
finite discretization over the standard model. The main contribution of this
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paper is that many of the known results gained within the standard continuum
type space also hold when it is replaced by a discrete type space.
JEL Classification: C72, D78, D82.
Keywords: Budget balance, decision efficiency, incentive compatibility, indi-
vidual rationality, mechanisms, public goods
1 Introduction
This paper revisits the classical public good provision problem in which a group of
agents have to decide whether to produce some indivisible and non-excludable public
good. This has been a central application of the theory of mechanism design. To
analyze this problem, many papers in the literature consider the model of ex ante
identical agents with a continuous, closed interval of types.1 In what follows, we call
such a model the standard model. One practical benefit of using the standard model
is that we can appeal to the revenue equivalence theorem, which reduces the search
for an appropriate mechanism to the class of the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
(VCG) mechanism.2 For example, we see this power of reduction in Krishna and
Perry (2000) and Williams (1999). Nevertheless, the use of the standard model is an
abstraction of reality so that our mere familiarity with it does not lender it legitimate.
Therefore, this paper proposes a “stress test” for the known results which heavily rely
on the standard model. To conduct this test, we consider a finite discretization of
the standard model of a continuous, closed interval of types. The main contribution
of this paper is that all the standard results in the classical public good provision
problem gained within a continuum type space also hold when it is replaced by a
discrete type space.3
1The reader is referred to Chapter 3.3 of Bo¨rgers (2015) for the textbook treatment of the classical
public good problem with identical agents whose type space constitutes a continuous closed interval
on the real line.
2The VCG mechanism is based on the contribution of Vickrey (1961), Clarke (1971), and Groves
(1973).
3Kos and Manea (2009) conducted a similar analysis in the context of bilateral trade setup.
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As in the standard model, we assume that each agent’s type, i.e., preferences
for public good, is chosen independently from an identical distribution over finitely
many values. Throughout this paper, we impose incentive compatibility and individ-
ual rationality on direct mechanisms, which maps each type profile to the probability
of providing a public good and monetary transfers across agents. A direct mecha-
nism satisfies Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC) if all agents’ announcing their
true type constitutes a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the direct mechanism. By the
celebrated revelation principle, we focus on direct mechanisms without loss of gener-
ality so that we call a direct mechanism simply a mechanism. A mechanism satisfies
interim individual rationality (IIR) if each agent guarantees a utility of zero (utility
of non-participation), provided that all agents announce their types truthfully. We
introduce two more requirements we sometimes impose on the mechanisms. A mech-
anism satisfies decision efficiency (EFF) if the public good is provided if and only if
the total surplus from providing the public good is at least as high as the cost of the
public good. A mechanism satisfies ex post budget balance (BB) if it satisfies budget
balance at any state.
To state our results below, we introduce the following categories. By a trivial
case we mean that it is always efficient to provide a public good. We call any other
case a nontrivial case. We obtain the following Bayesian implementation results in
our discrete setup.
• Theorem 1: There exists a mechanism satisfying BIC, IIR, EFF, and BB if and
only if a variant of the VCG mechanism results in ex ante budget surplus.
• Theorem 2: In any nontrivial case, as the population size gets large, any mech-
anism satisfying BIC, IIR, EFF results in the per capita ex ante budget deficit.
• Theorem 5: In any nontrival case, as the population size gets large, the ex ante
probability that the public good is provided converges to zero in any mechanism
satisfying BIC, IIR, and BB.4
Theorem 1 is considered a discrete type space counterpart of Theorem 2 of Kr-
ishna and Perry (2000) in a public good setup. In a bilateral trade environment with
4For this result, we assume that there are only two types.
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a discrete type space, Kos and Manea (2009) propose the VCG’ mechanism as a
variant of the VCG mechanism. Adapting the VCG’ mechanism to our public good
environment, we show in our Theorem 1 that there exists a mechanism satisfying
BIC, IIR, EFF, and BB if and only if the VCG’ mechanism results in ex ante budget
surplus. The difficulty of obtaining this result lies in the fact that we cannot appeal
to the optimality of the VCG mechanism established in Krishna and Perry (2000)
and Williams (1999), who exploit the continuum type space assumption. We rather
establish the optimality of the VCG’ mechanism by our Proposition 1.
Next, Theorem 2 characterizes the implications of our Theorem 1 in the context
of large economies. It shows that in all nontrivial cases, “any” mechanism satisfying
BIC, IIR, and EFF results in per capita ex ante budget deficit when the population
size of the economy gets infinite. Thus, for any mechanism satisfying BIC, IIR, and
EFF in large economies, we must accept not only the ex ante budget deficit but also
the per capita ex ante budget deficit. The basic logic for Theorem 2 goes as follows.
Each agent of a higher type can lower his payment by announcing a lower type. The
only incentive to not do so is that the agent is pivotal, i.e., his announcement will
change the probability that the public good is provided. However, in large economies,
the probability that an agent is pivotal converges to zero and thus it is prohibitively
costly to induce all agents of higher types to tell the truth in large economies. For
this result, however, we make an additional assumption, which says that the ex ante
probability that providing the public good is efficient converges to some positive
probability as the population size gets infinite. This assumption strikes us as being
innocuous because if it is not satisfied, the provision of the public good will not be
expected in large economies.
Our Theorem 2 clarifies the analysis of Section 4.2 of Ledyard and Palfrey (1994),
who consider exactly the same public good provision problem of this paper with only
two types.5 They rather show that as the population size gets large, the probability
that the public good is provided converges to zero in any mechanism satisfying BIC,
IIR, EFF, and BB.6 Our Theorem 2 shows that the result of Ledyard and Palfrey
5Ledyard and Palfrey (1994) also exclude the trivial case as we do.
6Ledyard and Palfrey (1994) investigate interim efficiency of the mechanism and handle the case
of limited (or even no) transfers as well as unlimited transfers. On the contrary, our paper only
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(1994) is vacuous because no such mechanisms exist in large economies. Then, we
are only left with the case where the ex ante probability that providing the public
good is efficient converges to zero as the population size gets infinite. In this case,
we show in our Theorem 3 that there exists a mechanism satisfying BIC, IIR, EFF,
and BB and as the size of the economy gets large, the probability that the public
good is provided converges to zero in any such mechanism. This is consistent with
the analysis of Ledyard and Palfrey (1994).
To understand how large the economy should be for Theorem 2, we also conduct
a simulation analysis for this negative result. Our simulation result roughly suggests
that there are no mechanisms satisfying BIC, IIR, EFF, and BB even for a relatively
small size of the economy. Sometimes, even five agents are large enough to establish
the impossibility result. However, we can sometimes promote the case for small
economies. For example, if a society is going to decide whether to provide a public
good or not, the social planner selects a small group of representative agents and
design a mechanism as suggested in our paper. In that case, our mechanism will
satisfy BIC, IIR, EFF, and BB.
Given the difficulty of imposing all the four properties, BIC, IIR, EFF, and BB
on the mechanisms, we now drop decision efficiency (EFF) from the requirement.
In a bilateral trade environment, Kos and Manea (2009) propose what they call the
tight mechanism to characterize the ex ante welfare-maximizing (or ex ante surplus-
maximizing) mechanisms satisfying BIC, IIR, and BB. Note that when we insist on
decision efficiency, the tight mechanism is reduced to the VCG’ mechanism. Adapting
the tight mechanism of Kos and Manea (2009) to our public good environment, we
show that there are mechanisms satisfying BIC, IIR, and BB if and only if the tight
mechanism results in ex ante budget surplus (Theorem 4). Then, our Theorem 5
restricts attention to a two-type environment and investigates the implications in
the context of large economies. That is, in any nontrivial case, as the size of the
economy gets large, the ex ante probability that the public good is provided converges
to zero in any mechanism satisfying BIC, IIR, and BB. This theorem is considered
a discrete type space counterpart of Theorem 2 of Mailath and Postlewaite (1990).
considers the case of unlimited transfers.
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This implies that we must give up decision efficiency in large economies if we insist on
BIC and IIR on the mechanism. Therefore, this might even suggest the necessity of
mandatory payment of taxes as opposed to voluntary contribution, which is embodied
by the individual rationality constraint.
Finally, we strengthen BIC and IIR into dominant strategy incentive compatibil-
ity (DSIC) and ex post individual rationality (EPIR), respectively.7 One benefit of
doing so is that we can completely drop any distributional assumption about types
and allow for any degree of correlation. We obtain the following dominant strategy
implementation result.
• Proposition 3: In any nontrivial case, there are no mechanisms satisfying DSIC,
EPIR, EFF, and BB, regardless of the size of the economy.
This result is a discrete type space counterpart of Theorem 7 of Green and Laffont
(1977) and therefore, also considered a stress test for the negative result of dominant
strategy implementation in the public good provision problem.8
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the
general concepts and notation used throughout the paper. Section 3 identifies a
necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of mechanisms satisfying BIC,
IIR, EFF, and BB, investigates the implication of the results in large economies,
and finally presents the simulation results. In Section 4, we drop EFF from the
requirement and characterize a condition for the existence of mechanisms satisfying
BIC, IIR, and BB and investigate its implication in large economies. In Section 5,
we replace BIC and IIR with DSIC and EPIR, respectively so that we investigate
the corresponding implications. Section 6 concludes. The Appendix contains all the
proofs omitted from the main body of the paper.
7The reader is referred to Chapter 4.3 of Bo¨rgers (2015) for the textbook treatment of the public
good problem using DSIC and EPIR. Once again, a big difference from our paper is that Bo¨rgers’
type space is assumed to be a closed interval in the real line.
8Green and Laffont (1977) need to include non-separable preferences as part of the domain in
establishing their Theorem 7. The reader is referred to Green and Laffont (1977) for the exact
nature of their rich environments.
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2 Preliminaries
There are N agents and with abuse of notation, we denote by N = {1, . . . , N} the
set of agents. We assume N ≥ 2 throughout the paper. A group of N agents must
decide whether to undertake the public project and if undertaken, how to distribute
the costs of the project among the members of the group. Each agent i has M ≥ 2
possible types θi ∈ Θ ≡ {θ1, · · · , θM} such that 0 < θ1 < · · · < θM . We assume
that every agent i of the same type θm attach the common value θm to the public
project . We further assume that each agent’s type is private information. Denote by
ΘN = {θ1, · · · , θM}N the set of possible type profiles. The types are independently
drawn from an identical distribution where P (θm) denotes the probability that θm
is chosen. Therefore, there is a common prior PN over ΘN such that for each θ =
(θ1, . . . , θN) ∈ ΘN ,
PN(θ) ≡ P (θ1)× · · · × P (θN)
The independence of types is essential for our results.9 Preferences of each agent
depend upon whether or not the public project is implemented and how much of the
monetary payment is incurred by that agent. Agents evaluate lotteries over outcomes
using expected utility. If the public project is built with probability q ∈ [0, 1] and
agent i makes a payment ti to the planner, then i’s preferences can be represented
by
vi = qθi − ti.
This formulation assumes that each agent’s preferences are quasilinear in money and
each individual is risk neutral.
A direct mechanism is defined as a triplet Γ = (Θ, x, (ti))i∈N where Θ = {θ1, · · · , θM}
is the set of actions available to agent i, i.e., each agent is asked to reveal his type;
x : ΘN → [0, 1] is the decision rule which specifies the probability that the pub-
lic good is provided; and ti : Θ
N → R is the payment or subsidy to agent i and
t = (t1, . . . , tN) is called the transfer rule. By the well known revelation principle,
9We conjecture that the identical distribution assumption is only needed for the ease of compu-
tation.
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we lose nothing to focus on direct mechanisms. In what follows, we denote by (x, t)
a direct mechanism or simply a mechanism.
Definition 1. A mechanism (x, t) satisfies Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC)
if, for each i ∈ N , θi, θ′i ∈ Θ,∑
θ−i∈ΘN−1
PN−1(θ−i)
[
θix(θi, θ−i)− ti(θi, θ−i)− θix(θ′i, θ−i) + ti(θ
′
i, θ−i)
]
≥ 0,
where PN−1(θ−i) ≡ ×j 6=iP (θj).
We introduce a stronger version of incentive compatibility.
Definition 2. A mechanism (x, t) satisfies dominant strategy incentive compatibility
(DSIC) if, for each i ∈ N, θ ∈ ΘN and θ′i ∈ Θ,
θix(θi, θ−i)− ti(θi, θ−i) ≥ θix(θ′i, θ−i)− ti(θ
′
i, θ−i).
Dominant strategy incentive compatibility does not need to make any distri-
butional assumption about how each agent’s type is realized and because of this
property, it is stronger than Bayesian incentive compatibility.
When there are N agents in the economy, providing the public good will incur a
cost equal to c(N) which is assumed to be an increasing function in N . Throughout
the paper, we further assume that θ1 < c(N)/N ≤ θM . We do not discuss the case
where θ1 = c(N)/N because it is considered a trivial case in the sense that the public
good should always be provided. This implies that the non-rivalry property of a pure
public good does not hold here. This is consistent with the setup of Mailath and
Postlewaite (1990).10
Definition 3. A mechanism (x, t) satisfies decision efficiency (EFF) if, for each
θ ∈ Θ,
x(θ) =
1 if
∑
i∈N θi ≥ c(N)
0 otherwise
In what follows, we denote by x∗(·) the efficient decision rule.
10Hellwig (2003) points out that this assumption is crucial for the result. Indeed, he completely
overturns the result of Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) by isolating the effect of changes in the
number of participants, while keeping cost technologies fixed.
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Definition 4. A mechanism (x, t) satisfies the ex post budget balance (BB) if, for
each θ ∈ ΘN , ∑
i∈N
ti(θ) = c(N) · x(θ)
Remark: Since x : ΘN → [0, 1] is a stochastic decision rule, ti(θ) here is interpreted
as the expected transfer, i.e., ti(θ) = x(θ)t˜i(θ) where t˜i(θ) is agent i’s actual payment
when the type profile θ is realized. This change is inconsequential because the agents
are assumed to be risk-neutral. Then the ex post budget balance constraint (BB) is
the same as before, i.e.,
∑
i∈N ti(θ) = c(N)x(θ), but it has a different implication: if∑
i∈N ti(θ) = c(N)x(θ), then, for each θ ∈ ΘN ,
x(θ)
(∑
i∈N
t˜i(θ)− c(N)
)
= 0,
which implies ∑
i∈N
t˜i(θ) =
c(N) if x(θ) > 00 if x(θ) = 0
The literature often assumes that if an agent decides not to participate in the
mechanism, he obtains a utility of zero. With this, we introduce the individual
rationality constraint.
Definition 5. A mechanism (x, t) satisfies the interim individual rationality (IIR)
if, for each i ∈ N and θi ∈ Θ,∑
θ−i∈ΘN−1
PN−1(θ−i) [θix(θi, θ−i)− ti(θi, θ−i)] ≥ 0.
We introduce a stronger version of individual rationality.
Definition 6. A mechanism (x, t) satisfies ex post individual rationality (EPIR) if,
for each i ∈ N and θ ∈ ΘN ,
θix(θi, θ−i)− ti(θi, θ−i) ≥ 0.
Note that ex post individual rationality implies interim individual rationality.
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3 When the First-Best is Implementable
We explain the structure of this section. In Section 3.1, we introduce the notation and
concepts used throughout Section 3. Section 3.2 characterizes the class of mechanisms
satisfying BIC, IIR, EFF, and BB. In Section 3.3, we essentially show that there are
no mechanisms satisfying BIC, IIR, EFF, and BB, when the size of the economy
gets large enough. Finally, in Section 3.4, we discuss our simulation analysis, which
investigates the implication of mechanisms satisfying BIC, IIR, EFF, and BB in large
economies. The main message of this simulation is that the negative results in large
economies can be established for a relatively small size of the economy.
3.1 Preliminaries
We call a mechanism (x, t) the first-best solution if x is the efficient decision rule
and (x, t) satisfies ex post budget balance. Recall that x∗ : ΘN → [0, 1] de-
notes the efficient decision rule. In order for any direct mechanism (x∗, t) to sat-
isfy ex post budget balance, we set tN(θ) = x
∗(θ) · c(N) − ∑
i 6=N
ti(θ). As usual, the
vector θ = (θ1, θ2, · · · , θN) denotes the types of all agents and the vector θ−i =
(θ1, θ2, · · · , θi−1, θi+1, · · · , θN) the types of all agents other than i. The vector (θ′i, θ−i) =
(θ1, θ2, · · · , θi−1, θ′i, θi+1, · · · , θN).
In what follows, we construct the transfer rule t = (t1, . . . , tN) such that the
direct mechanism (x∗, t) satisfies BIC, IIR, EFF, and BB.
In the standard model of a continuous, closed interval of types, it is well known
that the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism satisfies DSIC, EPIR, and EFF.
Definition 7. A mechanism (x∗, tV ) is called the VCG mechanism if, for each agent
i ∈ N and each θ ∈ ΘN ,
tVi (θ) = x
∗(θ−i)
(∑
j 6=i
θj − c(N)
)
− x∗(θ)
(∑
j 6=i
θj − c(N)
)
,
where with slight abuse of notation, we denote by x∗(θ−i) the efficient level of public
good provision as if the set of agents is only N\{i}, i.e., all agents but i.
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Note that the first term in tVi (θ) is the net benefits of all the other agents from
the public good if agent i were excluded. The second term is the net benefits of all
the other agents when agent i is included. So, in the VCG mechanism, each agent’s
payment is equal to the externality he imposes on the others.
Note that
∑
j 6=i θj + θi >
∑
j 6=i θj implies x
∗(θ) ≥ x∗(θ−i). We now categorize the
transfer rule tVi (θ) into the following three cases: for any θ ∈ ΘN and i ∈ N ,
1. If x∗(θ) = x∗(θ−i) = 0, tVi (θ) = 0
(∑
j 6=i
θj − c(N)
)
− 0
(∑
j 6=i
θj − c(N)
)
= 0;
2. If x∗(θ) = 1 and x∗(θ−i) = 0, tVi (θ) = 0
(∑
j 6=i
θj − c(N)
)
−1
(∑
j 6=i
θj − c(N)
)
=
c(N)−∑
j 6=i
θj > 0;
3. If x∗(θ) = x∗(θ−i) = 1, tVi (θ) = 1
(∑
j 6=i
θj − c(N)
)
− 1
(∑
j 6=i
θj − c(N)
)
= 0.
We consider the following modification of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism
(VCG’), which was originally proposed by Kos and Manea (2009) in a bilateral trade
environment. Here we aim to adapt this to our public good environment.
Definition 8. A mechanism (x∗, t
′
) is called the VCG’ mechanism if for each agent
i ∈ N and each θ ∈ ΘN ,
t′i(θ) =

min{θ˜i ∈ Θ :
∑
j 6=i
θj + θ˜i ≥ c(N)} if x∗(θ) = 1
0 otherwise
(1)
In the VCG’ mechanism, when the public good is provided, each agent’s payment
is equal to the lowest possible type which makes sure that the total valuation is higher
than the cost.
As we did for the VCG mechanism, we categorize the transfer rule t′i(θ) into the
following three cases: for each θ ∈ ΘN and i ∈ N ,
1. If x∗(θ) = x∗(θ−i) = 0, t′i(θ) = 0 = t
V
i (θ);
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2. If x∗(θ) = 1 and x∗(θ−i) = 0, t′i(θ) ≥ c(N)−
∑
j 6=i
θj = t
V
i (θ);
3. If x∗(θ) = x∗(θ−i) = 1, t′i(θ) ≥ c(N) −
∑
j 6=i
θj. Since c(N) −
∑
j 6=i
θj ≤ 0 in this
case, t′i(θ) = θ
1 > 0 = tVi (θ).
We establish the following properties for the VCG’ mechanism.
Claim 1. The VCG’ mechanism always generates a (weakly) higher ex post budget
surplus than the VCG mechanism.
Proof. For any θ ∈ ΘN ,
1. if x∗(θ) = 0, then tVi (θ) = t
′
i(θ) = 0 for each agent i, and thus
∑
i∈N t
V
i (θ) −
c(N)x∗(θ) =
∑
i∈N t
′
i(θ)− c(N)x∗(θ) = 0;
2. if x∗(θ) = 1, then t′i(θ) ≥ tVi (θ) for each agent i, and thus
∑
i∈N t
′
i(θ) −
c(N)x∗(θ) ≥∑i∈N tVi (θ)− c(N)x∗(θ).
Therefore, the VCG’ mechanism always generates a (weakly) higher ex post budget
surplus than the VCG mechanism.
It is easy to see that the VCG’ mechanism satisfies EPIR. We move on to the
incentive compatibility of the VCG’ mechanism.
Claim 2. The VCG’ mechanism satisfies DSIC.
Proof. Fix θm, θn ∈ Θ such that θm > θn arbitrarily. We write down the DSIC
constraints for these two types: for any θ−i ∈ ΘN−1,
ICθm→θn : θmx∗(θm, θ−i)− ti(θm, θ−i) ≥ θmx∗(θn, θ−i)− ti(θn, θ−i)
ICθn→θm : θnx∗(θn, θ−i)− ti(θn, θ−i) ≥ θnx∗(θm, θ−i)− ti(θm, θ−i),
where ICθm→θn stands for the incentive constraint which prevents type θm from
pretending to be type θn. We further rewrite the DSIC constraints: for any θ−i ∈
ΘN−1,
ICθm→θn : ti(θm, θ−i)− ti(θn, θ−i) ≤ θm (x∗(θm, θ−i)− x∗(θn, θ−i)) (2)
ICθn→θm : ti(θm, θ−i)− ti(θn, θ−i) ≥ θn (x∗(θm, θ−i)− x∗(θn, θ−i)) (3)
We consider the following three cases:
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1. if c(N)−∑j 6=i θj > θm > θn, then x∗(θm, θ−i) = x∗(θn, θ−i) = 0 and t′i(θm, θ−i) =
t′i(θ
n, θ−i) = 0. In this case, for (2), LHS = RHS = 0 and thus ICθm→θn is sat-
isfied; on the other hand, for (3), LHS = RHS = 0 and hence ICθn→θm is
satisfied;
2. if θm > c(N) −∑j 6=i θj > θn, then x∗(θm, θ−i) = 1 and x∗(θn, θ−i) = 0. By
definition, t′i(θ
m, θ−i) ∈ (θn, θm] and t′i(θn, θ−i) = 0. In this case, for (2),
LHS ≤ θm = RHS and thus ICθm→θn is satisfied; on the other hand, for (3),
LHS ≥ θn = RHS and thus ICθn→θm is satisfied;
3. if θm > θn > c(N)−∑j 6=i θj, then x∗(θm, θ−i) = x∗(θn, θ−i) = 1 and t′i(θm, θ−i) =
t′i(θ
n, θ−i) > 0. In this case, for (2), LHS = RHS = 0 and thus ICθm→θn is sat-
isfied; on the other hand, for (3), LHS = RHS = 0 and hence ICθn→θm is
satisfied.
Therefore, the VCG’ mechanism satisfies DSIC.
We also reexpress the transfer rule of the VCG’ mechanism.
Claim 3. The transfer rule in the VCG’ mechanism can be rewritten as follows: for
each i ∈ N , θm ∈ Θ, and θ−i ∈ ΘN−1,
t′i(θ
m, θ−i) =
m∑
l=1
θl
(
x∗(θl, θ−i)− x∗(θl−1, θ−i)
)
. (4)
where with abuse of notation, we slightly expand the domain of x∗ by including
θ0 ∈ R as a normalization such that x∗(θ0, θ−i) = 0 for every θ−i ∈ Θ−i.
Proof. Observe that for every θl ∈ Θ, x∗(θl, θ−i) is either 0 or 1, and x∗(θl, θ−i) ≥
x∗(θl−1, θ−i) because
∑
j 6=i θj + θ
l >
∑
j 6=i θj + θ
l−1. So, for each i ∈ N , θm ∈ Θ, and
θ−i ∈ ΘN−1,
1. if x∗(θm, θ−i) = 0, then t′i(θ
m, θ−i) = 0 according to (1). On the other hand, in
this case, x∗(θl, θ−i) = 0 for each l < m, and the right-hand side of (4) is equal
to
m∑
l=1
θl(0− 0) = 0, which is the same as t′i(θm, θ−i).
13
2. if x∗(θm, θ−i) = 1, then there exists l¯ ≤ m such that x∗(θl¯, θ−i) = 1 and
x∗(θl¯−1, θ−i) = 0, or equivalently,
∑
j 6=i θj + θ
m ≥ ∑j 6=i θj + θl¯ ≥ c(N) >∑
j 6=i θj + θ
l¯−1. Hence, t′i(θ
m, θ−i) = θl¯ according to (1). On the other hand,
the right-hand side of (4) becomes
m∑
l=l¯
θl
(
x∗(θl, θ−i)− x∗(θl−1, θ−i)
)
= θl¯(1− 0) +
m∑
l=l¯+1
θl(1− 1) = θl¯,
which is the same as t′i(θ
m, θ−i) in this case.
3.2 The Existence of Mechanisms satisfying BIC, IIR, EFF,
and BB
We will show that the VCG’ mechanism maximizes the ex ante budget surplus among
all mechanisms satisfying BIC, IIR, and EFF. To establish this, we need to compute
the ex ante budget surplus of any decision efficient mechanism (x∗, t). This result
reduces our search for an appropriate mechanism to the class of the VCG’ mecha-
nisms.
To simplify the notation, for each agent i ∈ N in a mechanism (x, t), we denote
by x¯i(θi) the expected probability that the public good is provided and by t¯i(θi)
agent i’s expected payment “when he is of type θi,” respectively. That is,
x¯i(θi) ≡
∑
θ−i∈ΘN−1
PN−1(θ−i)x(θi, θ−i)
and
t¯i(θi) ≡
∑
θ−i∈ΘN−1
PN−1(θ−i)ti(θi, θ−i).
In particular, for the VCG’ mechanism, we have
x¯∗i (θi) =
∑
θ−i∈ΘN−1
PN−1(θ−i)x∗(θi, θ−i)
t¯′i(θ
m) =
∑
θ−i∈ΘN−1
PN−1(θ−i)
m∑
l=1
θl
(
x∗(θl, θ−i)− x∗(θl−1, θ−i)
)
=
m∑
l=1
θl
(
x¯∗i (θ
l)− x¯∗i (θl−1)
)
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Now, we can compute the ex ante budget surplus Πea(x
∗) of any decision efficient
mechanism.
Πea(x
∗) ≡
∑
θ∈ΘN
PN(θ)
(∑
i∈N
ti(θ)− c(N)x∗(θ)
)
=
∑
i∈N
∑
θ∈ΘN
PN(θ)ti(θ)− c(N)
∑
θ∈ΘN
PN(θ)x∗(θ)
=
∑
i∈N
∑
θi∈Θ
P (θi)
 ∑
θ−i∈ΘN−1
PN−1(θ−i)ti(θi, θ−i)
− c(N)∑
θi∈Θ
P (θi)
 ∑
θ−i∈ΘN−1
PN−1(θ−i)x∗(θ)

=
∑
i∈N
∑
θi∈Θ
P (θi)t¯i(θi)− c(N)
∑
θi∈Θ
P (θi)x¯
∗
i (θi)
So, t¯i(θi) for each agent i and θi ∈ Θ must be as large as possible in order to achieve
the maximum ex ante expected budget surplus. Our objective here is to find their
maximum values among all mechanisms satisfying BIC and IIR.
We write down the lowest type’s IIR and the downward adjacent BIC constraints
for each agent i in any decision efficient mechanism (x∗, t):
IRθ1 : θ
1x¯∗i (θ
1)− t¯i(θ1) ≥ 0
ICθm→θm−1 : θ
mx¯∗i (θ
m)− t¯i(θm) ≥ θmx¯∗i (θm−1)− t¯i(θm−1)
We further rewrite the BIC constraints:
ICθm→θm−1 : t¯i(θ
m)− t¯i(θm−1) ≤ θm
(
x¯∗i (θ
m)− x¯∗i (θm−1)
)
We establish the following proposition:
Proposition 1. The VCG’ mechanism (x∗, t
′
) maximizes the ex ante budget surplus
among all mechanisms satisfying BIC, IIR, and EFF.11 Moreover, the ex ante budget
surplus of the VCG’ mechanism Π
′
ea(x
∗) is given as follows:
Π′ea(x
∗) =
M−1∑
m=1
x¯∗i (θ
m)
(
Nθm
M∑
l=m
P (θl)−Nθm+1
M∑
l=m+1
P (θl)− c(N)P (θm)
)
+ x¯∗i (θ
M)
(
NθM − c(N))P (θM). (5)
11Since the VCG’ mechanism satisfies DSIC and EPIR, then it also satisfies BIC and IIR.
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Proof. From IRθ1 , we know that for each agent i ∈ N ,
t¯i(θ
1) ≤ θ1x¯∗i (θ1) = t¯′i(θ1).
If θm > θ1, or equivalently, m > 1, then adding IRθ1 and ICθl→θl−1 for every 2 ≤ l ≤
m, we obtain that for each agent i ∈ N ,
t¯i(θ
m) ≤
m∑
l=1
θl
(
x¯∗i (θ
l)− x¯∗i (θl−1)
)
= t¯′i(θ
m).
Therefore, each type has the largest expected payment in the VCG’ mechanism, and
thus the VCG’ mechanism maximizes the ex ante expected budget surplus. Thus, it
only remains to compute Π
′
ea:
Π′ea(x
∗) =
∑
i∈N
∑
θi∈Θ
P (θi)t¯
′
i(θi)− c(N)
∑
θi∈Θ
P (θi)x¯
∗
i (θi)
=
∑
i∈N
M∑
m=1
P (θm)t¯′i(θ
m)− c(N)
M∑
m=1
P (θm)x¯∗i (θ
m)
= N
M∑
m=1
P (θm)
m∑
l=1
θl
(
x¯∗i (θ
l)− x¯∗i (θl−1)
)− c(N) M∑
m=1
P (θm)x¯∗i (θ
m)(
recall the definition of t¯
′
i(θ
m)
)
= N
M∑
m=1
θm
(
x¯∗i (θ
m)− x¯∗i (θm−1)
) M∑
l=m
P (θl)− c(N)
M∑
m=1
P (θm)x¯∗i (θ
m)
=
M−1∑
m=1
x¯∗i (θ
m)
(
Nθm
M∑
l=m
P (θl)−Nθm+1
M∑
l=m+1
P (θl)− c(N)P (θm)
)
+x¯∗i (θ
M)
(
NθM − c(N))P (θM)
We thus obtain the desired expression for Π
′
ea(x
∗) as in (5).
We are ready to state the main result of this subsection. This is considered a
discrete type space counterpart of Theorem 2 of Krishna and Perry (2000) in the
context of the public good provision problem.
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Theorem 1. There exists a mechanism (x∗, t) satisfying BIC, IIR, EFF, and BB if
and only if Π′ea(x
∗) ≥ 0.
Proof. We first prove the necessity of Π′ea(x
∗) ≥ 0. Suppose that (x∗, t) satisfies
BIC, IIR, EFF, and BB. Then (x∗, t) has zero ex ante expected budget surplus. By
Proposition 1, we obtain Π′ea(x
∗) ≥ 0.
We now prove the sufficiency. Consider the mechanism (x∗, t) where
t1(θ) = (t
′
1(θ)− Π′ea(x∗)) +
(
c(N)x∗(θ)−
∑
i∈N
t′i(θ) + Π
′
ea(x
∗)
)
−
(
c(N)x¯∗1(θ1)−
∑
i∈N
t¯′i(θ1) + Π
′
ea(x
∗)
)
,
t2(θ) = t
′
2(θ) +
(
c(N)x¯∗1(θ1)−
∑
i∈N
t¯′i(θ1) + Π
′
ea(x
∗)
)
,
ti(θ) = t
′
i(θ) for any i ∈ N\{1, 2}.
Then, the ex post budget balance (BB) is satisfied because for all θ ∈ ΘN ,
N∑
i=1
ti(θ) =
N∑
i=1
t′i(θ)− Π′ea(x∗) +
(
c(N)x∗(θ)−
N∑
i=1
t′i(θ) + Π
′
ea(x
∗)
)
= c(N)x∗(θ),
Besides, the interim expected payment of each agent i ∈ N is obtained as follows.
1. For i = 1, t¯1(θ1) = t¯
′
1(θ1)− Π′ea(x∗) ≤ t¯′1(θ1); (because Π′ea(x∗) ≥ 0)
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2. For i = 2,
t¯2(θ2) = t¯
′
2(θ2) +
∑
θ−2∈ΘN−1
PN−1(θ−2)
(
c(N)x¯∗1(θ1)−
∑
i∈N
t¯′i(θ1) + Π
′
ea(x
∗)
)
= t¯′2(θ2) +
∑
θ1∈Θ
P (θ1)
(
c(N)x¯∗1(θ1)−
∑
i∈N
t¯′i(θ1)
)
+ Π′ea(x
∗)(
∵ c(N)x¯∗1(θ1)−
∑
i∈N
t¯′i(θ1) + Π
′
ea(x
∗) only depends on θ1
)
= t¯′2(θ2) +
∑
θ∈ΘN
PN(θ)
(
c(N)x∗(θ)−
∑
i∈N
t′i(θ)
)
+ Π′ea(x
∗)
(∵ types are independently distributed)
= t¯′2(θ2)− Π′ea(x∗) + Π′ea(x∗) = t¯′2(θ2)
3. For i ∈ N\{1, 2}, t¯i(θi) = t¯′i(θi).
Hence, the interim expected transfers of all agents in the mechanism (x∗, t) are the
same as those in the VCG’ mechanism (x∗, t′), except agent 1. In particular, agent
1’s interim expected transfer in mechanism (x∗, t) differ from that in (x∗, t′) by a
negative constant −Π′ea(x∗) ≤ 0. Therefore, (x∗, t) also satisfies BIC and IIR.
3.3 Efficient Mechanisms in Large Economies
Now, let us drop BB and investigate the implication of mechanisms satisfying BIC,
IIR, and EFF in large economies. Let x∗[N ] denote the efficient decision rule in an
economy with N agents. In the theorem below, we shall show that in any nontrivial
case, the VCG’ mechanism results in the per capita ex ante budget deficit in large
economies. For this result, we assume limN→∞
∑
θ∈ΘN P
N(θ)x∗[N ](θ) > 0, which
means that the ex ante probability that providing a public good is efficient converges
to some positive probability, as the population size N goes to infinity. This assump-
tion strikes us as being innocuous because if it is not satisfied, the public good will
not be expected to be provided in large economies.
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Theorem 2. Assume limN→∞
∑
θ∈ΘN P
N(θ)x∗[N ](θ) > 0. Then, as the size of the
economy gets large (i.e., N → ∞), any mechanism satisfying BIC, IIR, and EFF
results in the per capita ex ante budget deficit, i.e., limN→∞Π′ea(x
∗[N ])/N < 0.
Proof. We have assumed that θ1 < limN→∞ c(N)/N ≤ θM . We take the expression
for Π
′
ea(x
∗[N ]) from Proposition 1:
Π′ea(x
∗[N ]) =
M−1∑
m=1
x¯∗i [N ](θ
m)
(
Nθm
M∑
l=m
P (θl)−Nθm+1
M∑
l=m+1
P (θl)− c(N)P (θm)
)
,
+ x¯∗i [N ](θ
M)
(
NθM − c(N))P (θM)
where x¯∗i [N ](θ
m) =
∑
θ−i∈ΘN−1 P
N−1(θ−i)x∗(θm, θ−i) for each θm ∈ Θ. We use the
following lemma whose proof is relegated to the Appendix.
Lemma 1. lim
N→∞
x¯∗i [N ](θ
m) = lim
N→∞
x¯∗i [N ](θ
n) for any θm, θn ∈ Θ and i ∈ N .
This lemma says that the probability that any agent can be pivotal is approxi-
mately zero in large economies. Therefore, for N large enough,
Π′ea(x
∗[N ]) ≈ x¯∗i [N ](θM)
{
M−1∑
m=1
(
Nθm
M∑
l=m
P (θl)−Nθm+1
M∑
l=m+1
P (θl)
)
+NθMP (θM)− c(N)
}
≈ x¯∗i [N ](θM)
{
M∑
m=2
Nθm
(
M∑
l=m
P (θl)−
M∑
l=m
P (θl)
)
+Nθ1
M∑
l=1
P (θl)− c(N)
}
≈ x¯∗i [N ](θM)
(
Nθ1 − c(N)) .
We next use the following lemma whose proof is also relegated to the Appendix.
Lemma 2. lim
N→∞
∑
θ∈ΘN
PN(θ)x∗[N ](θ) = lim
N→∞
x¯∗i [N ](θ
M).
This lemma says that the ex ante expected probability of public good provision is
approximately the same as the interim expected probability of public good provision
in large economies. Hence,
lim
N→∞
Π′ea(x
∗[N ])
N
= lim
N→∞
x¯∗i [N ](θ
M)
(
θ1 − c(N)
N
)
= lim
N→∞
(∑
θ∈ΘN
PN(θ)x∗[N ](θ)
)(
θ1 − c(N)
N
)
< 0
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because limN→∞
∑
θ∈ΘN P
N(θ)x∗[N ](θ) > 0 and θ1 < limN→∞ c(N)/N .
So, as the economy gets large, if the public good is provided with strictly positive
probability, the VCG’ mechanism results in the per capita ex ante budget deficit.
Combining Theorem 2 and Proposition 1, we conclude that there are no mechanisms
satisfying BIC, IIR, EFF, and BB in large economies. We formally state this result
below.
Corollary 1. Assume limN→∞
∑
θ∈ΘN P
N(θ)x∗[N ](θ) > 0. Then, as the size of the
economy gets large (i.e., N →∞), there are no mechanisms satisfing BIC, IIR, EFF,
and BB.
Remark: When M = 2, this result is closely related to the analysis in Section 4.2 of
Ledyard and Palfrey (1994), who consider the same public good provision problem
of this paper but differ from us in that the distribution of the private good, as well
as the public good decision, affects social welfare. They show that as the population
size gets large, the probability that the public good is provided converges to zero
in any mechanism satisfying BIC, IIR, EFF, and BB. However, in any nontrivial
case, our Corollary 1 shows that there are no mechanisms satisfying BIC, IIR, EFF,
and BB in large economies. Therefore, the claim of Ledyard and Palfrey (1994) is
vacuous in any nontrivial case.
Therefore, the existence of positive results in large economies, if any, only lies in
the trivial case where limN→∞
∑
θ∈ΘN P
N(θ)x∗[N ](θ) = 0, i.e., the ex ante expected
probability that providing the public good is efficient is zero.
Theorem 3. Assume that limN→∞
∑
θ∈ΘN P
N(θ)x∗[N ](θ) = 0. Then, there exists a
mechanism (x∗, t) satisfying BIC, IIR, EFF, and BB in any economy with population
size N . However, as the size of the economy gets large (i.e., N → ∞), the ex ante
probability that the public good is provided converges to zero.
Proof. Recall that in the proof of Theorem 2, we obtain
lim
N→∞
Π′ea(x
∗[N ])
N
= lim
N→∞
(∑
θ∈ΘN
PN(θ)x∗[N ](θ)
)(
θ1 − c(N)
N
)
.
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When limN→∞
∑
θ∈ΘN P
N(θ)x∗[N ](θ) = 0, limN→∞Π′ea(x
∗[N ])/N = 0 and by Theo-
rem 1, there exists a mechanism (x∗, t) satisfying BIC, IIR, EFF, and BB.
Our Theorem 3 says that there is a mechanism satisfying BIC, IIR, EFF, and
BB, but as the population size gets large, the ex ante probability that the public
good is provided converges to zero in any mechanism satisfying BIC, IIR, EFF, and
BB. This is consistent with Ledyard and Palfrey (1994).
3.4 Simulation Results
In the previous subsections, we have shown the following results: (i) when N is
small, there exists a mechanism satisfying BIC, IIR, EFF, and BB; but (ii) when N
is sufficiently large, however, such a mechanism no longer exists. Now we will run
simulations to find the dividing line between them, i.e., when a mechanism satisfying
BIC, IIR, EFF, and BB starts to disappear. For the sake of simplicity, we confine
ourselves to a two type environment in this subsection. That is, Θ = {θ1, θ2}.
Assume P (θ1) = ε ∈ (0, 1) and θ1 < c(N)/N ≤ θ2.
In this case, there must exist k ∈ (0, N ] such that c(N) = kθ2 + (N − k)θ1 is
satisfied for any c(N) ∈ (Nθ1, Nθ2]. We obtain k = (c(N)−Nθ1) /(θ2 − θ1). Note
that k need not be an integer and k/N = (c(N)/N − θ1) /(θ2 − θ1) > 0 because
c(N)/N > θ1. Hence, k is an increasing function of N and in what follows, we
denote k by k(N).
Define k∗(N) ≡ dk(N)e, the least integer greater than or equal to k(N) for every
N . Then we have
(k∗(N)− 1)θ2 + (N − k∗(N) + 1)θ1 < c(N) ≤ k∗(N)θ2 + (N − k∗(N))θ1
for every N and the efficient decision rule x∗ can be rewritten as follows:
x(θ) =
1 if at least k∗(N) agents are of type θ20 otherwise
The interim expected probability of public good provision is computed below: for
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each agent i ∈ N ,
x¯∗i (θ
1) = PN−1(θ−i)x∗(θ1, θ−i) =
N−1∑
k=k∗(N)
pN−1(k);
x¯∗i (θ
2) = PN−1(θ−i)x∗(θ2, θ−i) =
N−1∑
k=k∗(N)−1
pN−1(k)
where pN−1(k) is the probability that k out of (N − 1) agents are of type θ2, i.e.,
pN−1(k) ≡ εN−1−k · (1− ε)k
(
N − 1
k
)
.
We show the following property:
Lemma 3.
Π′ea(x
∗) < (θ2 − θ1)Π¯ea(x∗)
where
Π¯ea(x
∗) ≡ −(k∗(N)− 1)
N−1∑
k=k∗(N)
pN−1(k) + (1− ε)(N − k∗(N) + 1)pN−1(k∗(N)− 1).
Proof. The proof is relegated to the Appendix.
Therefore, if Π¯ea(x
∗) > 0, then Π′ea(x
∗) ≥ 0 can be satisfied and by Theorem 1,
we are able to construct the transfer rule t such that the direct mechanism (x∗, t)
satisfies BIC, IIR, EFF, and BB.
In what follows, we run simulations to find out when Π¯ea(x
∗) ≥ 0 is no longer
satisfied. We first fix k(N) = (1−ε)N and k∗(N) = d(1−ε)Ne.12 Recall that (1−ε)
is the probability that a given agent is of type θ2. So, if θ2 is more likely to occur
than θ1 for each agent, i.e., 1−ε > 1/2, then it is efficient to provide the public good
if more than N/2 agents are of type θ2.
12In this case, the VCG’ mechanism results in per capita ex ante budget deficit as the size of
economy gets large. The details of this assertion are in the Appendix.
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There are two inputs in the simulation: N ≥ 2 and ε ∈ (0, 1). The output is
Π¯ea(x
∗). The simulation results are shown in Table 1 below and the positive outputs
are highlighted in red color.
We are particularly interested in finding the cutoff N0 such that Π¯ea(x
∗) ≥ 0 for
all N ≤ N0 and Π¯ea(x∗) < 0 for all N > N0. For example, we consider when ε = 0.5,
N0 = 4. This implies that no mechanisms satisfy BIC, IIR, EFF, and BB in an
economy with more than four agents. This is an extremely small economy. However,
N0 reaches its local maximum at the two extremes of ε where either ε→ 0 or ε→ 1.
For example, when ε = 0.9 and N0 = 18. Nevertheless, these are still relatively small
economies. Therefore, we conclude that the positive results exist only in relatively
small economies and the negative results in large economies are quite prevalent.
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Table 1: Simulation Results for Π¯ea(x
∗)
ε = 0.1 ε = 0.2 ε = 0.3 ε = 0.4 ε = 0.5 ε = 0.6 ε = 0.7 ε = 0.8 ε = 0.9
N = 2 0.810 0.640 0.490 0.360 0.500 0.480 0.420 0.320 0.180
N = 3 0.729 0.512 0.343 0.216 0.250 0.224 0.441 0.384 0.243
N = 4 0.656 0.410 -0.069 0.086 0.063 0.166 0.181 0.410 0.292
N = 5 0.590 -0.573 -0.144 -0.328 -0.063 0.028 0.146 0.410 0.328
N = 6 0.531 -0.655 -0.168 -0.389 -0.375 -0.082 0.068 0.147 0.354
N = 7 0.478 -0.682 -1.000 -0.373 -0.406 -0.289 -0.025 0.127 0.372
N = 8 0.430 -0.671 -0.980 -0.983 -0.816 -0.289 -0.134 0.091 0.383
N = 9 0.387 -0.638 -0.909 -0.908 -0.770 -0.549 -0.274 0.040 0.387
N = 10 -2.402 -2.329 -2.030 -1.661 -1.262 -0.850 -0.251 -0.020 0.387
N = 11 -2.441 -2.282 -1.932 -1.541 -1.146 -0.765 -0.411 -0.101 0.124
N = 12 -2.448 -2.190 -1.783 -1.365 -1.710 -1.112 -0.598 -0.175 0.119
N = 13 -2.429 -2.068 -1.604 -2.250 -1.534 -0.947 -0.803 -0.260 0.111
N = 14 -2.389 -1.927 -2.967 -2.027 -2.162 -1.331 -0.682 -0.353 0.099
N = 15 -2.333 -4.128 -2.750 -3.019 -1.929 -1.744 -0.907 -0.454 0.083
N = 16 -2.265 -3.976 -2.500 -2.761 -2.616 -1.515 -1.151 -0.405 0.064
N = 17 -2.187 -3.786 -4.067 -2.455 -2.331 -1.964 -0.946 -0.516 0.042
N = 18 -2.101 -3.569 -3.790 -3.554 -3.073 -1.669 -1.204 -0.636 0.017
N = 19 -2.011 -3.335 -3.477 -3.209 -2.738 -2.148 -1.481 -0.762 -0.009
N = 20 -6.375 -5.954 -5.221 -4.395 -3.531 -2.651 -1.202 -0.893 -0.038
N = 21 -6.281 -5.710 -4.890 -4.020 -3.150 -2.301 -1.490 -0.740 -0.104
N = 22 -6.164 -5.434 -4.520 -3.603 -3.991 -2.835 -1.795 -0.880 -0.136
N = 23 -6.026 -5.133 -4.129 -4.881 -3.566 -2.427 -2.113 -1.027 -0.170
N = 24 -5.870 -4.817 -6.041 -4.430 -4.452 -2.987 -1.764 -1.180 -0.207
N = 25 -5.701 -7.797 -5.620 -5.783 -3.985 -3.567 -2.096 -1.337 -0.246
4 When the First Best is Not Implementable
Thus far, we conclude, especially by Corollary 1, that there are no mechanisms
satisfying BIC, IIR, EFF, and BB in large economies. The simulation results in the
previous section even suggest that there are no mechanisms satisfying BIC, IIR, EFF,
and BB in a relatively small economy. In this section, we drop decision efficiency
(EFF) from the requirements and mainly consider the case where Π′ea(x
∗) < 0, which
together with our Proposition 1 implies that no mechanism (x∗, t) satisfies BIC, IIR,
EFF, and BB. We describe the structure of this section. In Section 4.1, we introduce
the notation and concepts used throughout this section. Section 4.2 characterizes the
class of mechanisms satisfying BIC, IIR, and BB. In Section 4.3, we show that when
the size of the economy gets large, the probability that the public good is provided
converges to zero in any mechanism satisfying BIC, IIR, and BB.
4.1 Prelminaries
First, we define the expected social welfare of any mechanism (x, t):
SW (x) =
∑
θ∈ΘN
PN(θ)x(θ)
(∑
i∈N
θi − c(N)
)
.
Clearly, the decision efficient rule x∗ maximizes the expected social welfare. However,
in this section, we include the case that there is no transfer rule t such that the
mechanism (x∗, t) satisfies BIC, IIR, and BB.
Recall that x¯i(θi) is the interim expected probability of public good provision and
that t¯i(θi) is the expected payment of agent i when his type is θi. We characterize
the mechanisms satisfying BIC below. We say that a decision rule x is implementable
if there exists a transfer rule t such that the mechanism (x, t) satisfies BIC. We first
characterize the implementability in terms of monotonicity of a decision rule.
Lemma 4. A decision rule x is implementable if and only if, for each i ∈ N and
θm, θn ∈ Θ with m > n, x¯i(θm) ≥ x¯i(θn).
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Proof. Now we can write down the BIC constraints for any mechanism (x, t): for
any m 6= n,
ICθm→θn : θmx¯i(θm)− t¯i(θm) ≥ θmx¯i(θn)− t¯i(θn)
ICθn→θm : θnx¯i(θn)− t¯i(θn) ≥ θnx¯i(θm)− t¯i(θm)
We further rewrite the BIC constraints: for any m 6= n,
ICθm→θn : t¯i(θm)− t¯i(θn) ≤ θm (x¯i(θm)− x¯i(θn)) (6)
ICθn→θm : t¯i(θm)− t¯i(θn) ≥ θn (x¯i(θm)− x¯i(θn)) (7)
Note that we say that a decision rule x is implementable if there exists a transfer rule
t such that (x, t) satisfies BIC. So, from (6) and (7), we know that x is implementable
if and only if (θm−θn) (x¯i(θm)− x¯i(θn)) ≥ 0, i.e., x¯i(θm) ≥ x¯i(θn) for any m > n.
Second, we compute the ex ante budget surplus for the mechanism (x, t):
Πea(x
∗) ≡
∑
θ∈ΘN
PN(θ)
(∑
i∈N
ti(θ)− c(N)x(θ)
)
=
∑
i∈N
∑
θ∈ΘN
PN(θ)ti(θ)− c(N)
∑
θ∈ΘN
P (θ)x(θ)
=
∑
i∈N
∑
θi∈Θ
P (θi)
 ∑
θ−i∈ΘN−1
PN−1(θ−i)ti(θi, θ−i)
− c(N)∑
θi∈Θ
P (θi)
 ∑
θ−i∈ΘN−1
PN−1(θ−i)x(θ)

=
∑
i∈N
∑
θi∈Θ
P (θi)t¯i(θi)− c(N)
∑
θi∈Θ
P (θi)x¯i(θi)
So, t¯i(θi) for each agent i and θi ∈ Θ must be as large as possible in order to achieve
the maximum ex ante expected budget surplus.
Finally, let us introduce the tight mechanism (x, tT ), which was originally pro-
posed by Kos and Manea (2009) in a bilateral trade environment. We adapt this to
our public good environment.
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Definition 9. A mechanism (x, tT ) is called the tight mechanism if for each agent
i ∈ N , θm ∈ Θ and θ−i ∈ ΘN−1,
tTi (θ
m, θ−i) =
m∑
l=1
θl
(
x(θl, θ−i)− x(θl−1, θ−i)
)
.
where with abuse of notation, we slightly expand the domain of x by including θ0 ∈ R
as a normalization such that x(θ0, θ−i) ≡ 0 for every θ−i ∈ ΘN−1.
Remark: Note that if x = x∗, then the tight mechanism indeed reduces to the VCG’
mechanism we discussed in the previous section.
In the tight mechanism, an agent’s payment is equal to his marginal contribution
to the public good. The interim expected payment for agent i of type θm in the tight
mechanism is
t¯T (θm) =
∑
θ−i∈ΘN−1
PN−1(θ−i)
m∑
l=1
θl
(
x(θl, θ−i)− x(θl−1, θ−i)
)
=
m∑
l=1
θl
(
x¯i(θ
l)− x¯i(θl−1)
)
where x¯i(θi) ≡
∑
θ−i∈ΘN−1 P
N−1(θ−i)x(θi, θ−i) for every θi ∈ Θ. We shall show that
the tight mechanism satisfies BIC and IIR.
Claim 4. The tight mechanism satisfies BIC and IIR.
Proof. Fix θm, θn ∈ Θ such that θm > θn arbitrarily. Recall that the BIC constraints
for a mechanism (x, t) are as follows:
ICθm→θn : t¯i(θm)− t¯i(θn) ≤ θm (x¯i(θm)− x¯i(θn))
ICθn→θm : t¯i(θm)− t¯i(θn) ≥ θn (x¯i(θm)− x¯i(θn)) .
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Note that in the tight mechanism (x, tT ),
t¯Ti (θ
m)− t¯Ti (θn) =
m∑
l=1
θl
(
x¯i(θ
l)− x¯i(θl−1)
)− n∑
l=1
θl
(
x¯i(θ
l)− x¯i(θl−1)
)
=
m∑
l=n+1
θl
(
x¯i(θ
l)− x¯i(θl−1)
)
≤
m∑
l=n+1
θm
(
x¯i(θ
l)− x¯i(θl−1)
)
(∵ θl ≤ θm for any l ≤ m)
= θm
m∑
l=n+1
(
x¯i(θ
l)− x¯i(θl−1)
)
= θm (x¯i(θ
m)− x¯i(θn)) .
Hence, the tight mechanism (x, tT ) satisfies ICθm→θn . In particular, when n = m−1,
t¯Ti (θ
m)− t¯Ti (θm−1) = θm
(
x¯i(θ
m)− x¯i(θm−1)
)
.
In other words, each agent’s downward adjacent BIC constraint is binding. Also,
t¯Ti (θ
m)− t¯Ti (θn) =
m∑
l=n+1
θl
(
x¯i(θ
l)− x¯i(θl−1)
)
>
m∑
l=n+1
θn
(
x¯i(θ
l)− x¯i(θl−1)
)
(∵ θl > θn for any l > n)
= θn
m∑
l=n+1
(
x¯i(θ
l)− x¯i(θl−1)
)
= θn (x¯i(θ
m)− x¯i(θn)) .
Hence, the tight mechanism (x, tT ) satisfies ICθn→θm .
Besides, we can write down the IIR constraints of any mechanism (x, t) as follows:
for any θm ∈ Θ,
IRθm : θ
mx¯i(θ
m)− t¯i(θm) ≥ 0⇒ t¯i(θm) ≤ θmx¯i(θm).
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In the tight mechanism (x, tT ), if m > 1, we have
t¯Ti (θ
m) =
m∑
l=1
θl
(
x¯i(θ
l)− x¯i(θl−1)
)
= θmx¯i(θ
m) +
m−1∑
l=1
(θl − θl+1)x¯i(θl)
≤ θmx¯i(θm) (∵ θl ≤ θl+1 for any l)
On the other hand, if m = 1,
t¯Ti (θ
m) = t¯Ti (θ
1) = θ1
(
x¯i(θ
1)− x¯i(θ0)
)
= θ1x¯i(θ
1).
In other words, each agent’s lowest type’s IIR constraint is binding. Therefore, the
tight mechanism (x, tT ) satisfies IIR.
Therefore, the tight mechanism (x, tT ) has the following property: each agent’s
downward adjacent incentive compatibility constraints as well as his lowest type’s
individual rationality constraints are binding.
4.2 Characterizations of Mechanisms Satisfying BIC, IIR,
and BB
Recall that a decision rule x is implementable if there exists a transfer rule t such
that the mechanism (x, t) satisfies BIC. We now establish the following proposition.
This reduces our search for mechanisms to the class of the tight mechanisms.
Proposition 2. Let x be an implementable decision rule. Then, the tight mechanism
(x, tT ) maximizes the ex ante budget surplus among all mechanisms satisfying BIC
and IIR. Moreover, we obtain the ex ante budget surplus of the tight mechanism as
follows:
ΠTea(x) =
M−1∑
m=1
x¯i(θ
m)
(
Nθm
M∑
l=m
P (θl)−Nθm+1
M∑
l=m+1
P (θl)− c(N)P (θm)
)
+ x¯i(θ
M)
(
NθM − c(N))P (θM) (8)
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Proof. The proof is completed verbatim in the proof of Proposition 1, except that
x∗ is replaced by x. From IRθ1 , we know that for each agent i ∈ N ,
t¯i(θ
1) ≤ θ1x¯i(θ1) = t¯Ti (θ1).
If θm > θ1, or equivalently, m > 1, then adding IRθ1 and ICθl→θl−1 for every 2 ≤ l ≤
m, we obtain that for each agent i ∈ N ,
t¯i(θ
m) ≤
m∑
l=1
θl
(
x¯i(θ
l)− x¯i(θl−1)
)
= t¯Ti (θ
m).
Therefore, each agent has the largest interim expected payment in the tight mecha-
nism, and thus the tight mechanism maximizes the ex ante expected budget surplus.
Finally, we obtain the expression for the ex ante budget surplus of the tight mecha-
nism:
ΠTea(x) =
∑
i∈N
∑
θi∈Θ
P (θi)t¯
T
i (θi)− c(N)
∑
θi∈Θ
P (θi)x¯i(θi)
=
∑
i∈N
M∑
m=1
P (θm)t¯Ti (θ
m)− c(N)
M∑
m=1
P (θm)x¯i(θ
m)
= N
M∑
m=1
P (θm)
m∑
l=1
θl
(
x¯i(θ
l)− x¯i(θl−1)
)− c(N) M∑
m=1
P (θm)x¯i(θ
m)(
recall the definition of t¯Ti (θ
m)
)
= N
M∑
m=1
θm
(
x¯i(θ
m)− x¯i(θm−1)
) M∑
l=m
P (θl)− c(N)
M∑
m=1
P (θm)x¯i(θ
m)
=
M−1∑
m=1
x¯i(θ
m)
(
Nθm
M∑
l=m
P (θl)−Nθm+1
M∑
l=m+1
P (θl)− c(N)P (θm)
)
+x¯i(θ
M)
(
NθM − c(N))P (θM)
The following theorem is a generalization of Theorem 1, which includes the case
that no mechanism (x∗, t) satisfies BIC, IIR and BB.
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Theorem 4. Let x be an implementable decision rule. Then, there exists a transfer
rule t : ΘN → RN such that the mechanism (x, t) satisfies BIC, IIR, and BB if and
only if ΠTea(x) ≥ 0.
Proof. The proof is completed verbatim in the proof of Theorem 1, except that x∗
is replaced by x and VCG’ mechanism is replaced by the tight mechanism.
4.3 Mechanisms Satisfying BIC, IIR, and BB in Large Economies
We will investigate the class of mechanisms satisfying BIC, IIR, and BB in large
economies. To simplify our argument, we restrict ourselves to the two type space
in this subsection. That is, Θ = {θ1, θ2}. Assume θ1 < limN→∞ c(N)/N ≤ θ2 and
P (θ1) = ε where 0 < ε < 1.
Then there must exist k(N) which is an increasing function of N such that c(N) =
k(N)θ2 + (N − k(N))θ1 is satisfied. We obtain
k(N)
N
=
c(N)/N − θ1
θ2 − θ1 .
Since θ1 < limN→∞ c(N)/N ≤ θ2, 0 < limN→∞ k(N)/N ≤ 1 must be satisfied. Define
k∗(N) ≡ dk(N)e, the least integer greater than or equal to k(N) for every N .
Denote by k(θ) the number of θ2-type agents in profile θ ∈ ΘN . In particular, if
k(θ) < k∗(N), then
∑N
i=1 θi < c(N). We impose the following assumption:
Assumption 1. Every decision rule x satisfies the following property: k(θ) <
k∗(N)⇒ x(θ) = 0.
In other words, the public good shall not be provided whenever the total surplus
generated by the public good is lower than the cost of providing it. We consider
this as a mild assumption because it is satisfied in a welfare-maximizing mechanism
which is indeed considered by Theorem 2 of Mailath and Postlewaite (1990). We
also impose the following anonymity condition on decision rules.
Assumption 2. Every decision rule x satisfies the following property: for two pro-
files θ, θ
′ ∈ ΘN , x(θ) = x(θ′) whenever k(θ) = k(θ′).
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In other words, the probability that the public good is provided must be the same
in any two type profiles if they have the same number of θ2-type agents as well as
the same number of θ1-type agents. This strikes us as being quite natural in large
economies.
By Assumption 2, we can rewrite the decision rule x as x(k), a function of the
number of θ2-type agents which we denote by k. Let pN(k) be the probability that
k out of N agents are of type θ2. We are now ready to state the result.
Theorem 5. Suppose that there are only two types, Θ = {θ1, θ2} and Assumption 1
and 2 hold. Let {x[N ]}N be a sequence of decision rules such that for each population
size N , there exists a transfer rule t for which the mechanism (x[N ], t) satisfies BIC,
IIR, and BB in the N -agent economy.13 Then, as the size of the economy gets large
(i.e., N →∞), the ex ante probability that the public good is provided converges to
zero, i.e.,
∑N
k=1 p
N(k)x(k)→ 0.
Remark: Theorem 5 is considered a discrete type space counterpart of Theorem 2
of Mailath and Postlewaite (1990).
Proof. We take the expression for ΠTea(x[N ]) from Proposition 2:
ΠTea(x[N ]) =
M−1∑
m=1
x¯i[N ](θ
m)
(
Nθm
M∑
l=m
P (θl)−Nθm+1
M∑
l=m+1
P (θl)− c(N)P (θm)
)
,
+ x¯i[N ](θ
M)
(
NθM − c(N))P (θM)
where x¯i[N ](θ
m) =
∑
θ−i∈ΘN−1 P
N−1(θ−i)x[N ](θm, θ−i) for each θm ∈ Θ. In particu-
lar, when M = 2,
ΠTea(x[N ]) = x¯i[N ](θ
1)
(
Nθ1 −Nθ2(1− ε)− εc(N))+(1−ε)x¯i[N ](θ2) (Nθ2 − c(N)) .
13The existence of such a sequence is automatically guaranteed because we consider the mech-
anism (x, t) such that the public good never be provided and no transfers are made. Such a
mechanism trivially satisfies BIC, IIR, and BB and it works for any number of agents.
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Hence,
ΠTea(x[N ])
N
= x¯i[N ](θ
1)
(
θ1 − θ2(1− ε)− εc(N)
N
)
+ (1− ε)x¯i[N ](θ2)
(
θ2 − c(N)
N
)
=
∑
θ−i∈ΘN−1
PN−1(θ−i)x[N ](θ1, θ−i)
(
θ1 − θ2(1− ε)− εc(N)
N
)
+(1− ε)
∑
θ−i∈ΘN−1
PN−1(θ−i)x[N ](θ2, θ−i)
(
θ2 − c(N)
N
)
( recall the definition of x¯i[N ](θ
1) and x¯i[N ](θ
2))
=
N−1∑
k=0
pN−1(k)x[N ](k)
(
θ1 − θ2(1− ε)− εc(N)
N
)
+(1− ε)
N−1∑
k=0
pN−1(k)x[N ](k + 1)
(
θ2 − c(N)
N
)
(x is anonymous by Assumption 2 )
where pN−1(k) is the probability that k out of (N − 1) agents are of type θ2 and
x[N ](k) is the probability of public good provision when there are k agents who are
of type θ2.
The expression can be further rewritten as follows:
ΠTea(x[N ])
N
=
N−1∑
k=1
x[N ](k)
[
pN−1(k)
(
θ1 − θ2(1− ε)− εc(N)
N
)
+ pN−1(k − 1)(1− ε)
(
θ2 − c(N)
N
)]
+(1− ε)pN−1(N − 1)x[N ](N)
(
θ2 − c(N)
N
)
+ pN−1(0)x[N ](0)
(
θ1 − θ2(1− ε)− εc(N)
N
)
=
N−1∑
k=k∗(N)
x[N ](k)
[
pN−1(k)
(
θ1 − θ2(1− ε)− εc(N)
N
)
+ pN−1(k − 1)(1− ε)
(
θ2 − c(N)
N
)]
+(1− ε)Nx[N ](N)
(
θ2 − c(N)
N
)
(x[N ](k) = 0 whenever k < k∗(N) by Assumption 1)
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Hence,
lim
N→∞
ΠTea(x[N ])
N
= lim
N→∞
N−1∑
k=k∗(N)
x[N ](k)
[
pN−1(k)
(
θ1 − θ2(1− ε)− εc(N)
N
)
+ pN−1(k − 1)(1− ε)
(
θ2 − c(N)
N
)]
+ lim
N→∞
(1− ε)Nx[N ](N)
(
θ2 − c(N)
N
)
= lim
N→∞
N−1∑
k=k∗(N)
x[N ](k)
[
pN−1(k)
(
θ1 − θ2(1− ε)− εc(N)
N
)
+ pN−1(k − 1)(1− ε)
(
θ2 − c(N)
N
)]
(∵ (1− ε)N → 0 as N →∞)
For simplicity, let
A ≡ θ1 − θ2(1− ε)− εc(N)
N
= ε
(
θ1 − c(N)
N
)
+ (1− ε)(θ1 − θ2) < 0;
B ≡ (1− ε)
(
θ2 − c(N)
N
)
≥ 0.
Observe that
|A| − |B| = −A−B
= −ε
(
θ1 − c(N)
N
)
− (1− ε)(θ1 − θ2)− (1− ε)
(
θ2 − c(N)
N
)
= −ε
(
θ1 − c(N)
N
)
− (1− ε)
(
θ1 − c(N)
N
)
= −
(
θ1 − c(N)
N
)
> 0.
The expression of limN→∞ΠTea(x[N ])/N is rewritten as follows:
lim
N→∞
ΠTea(x[N ])
N
= lim
N→∞
N−1∑
k=k∗(N)
x[N ](k)
[
pN−1(k)A+ pN−1(k − 1)B] .
Since limN→∞ k∗(N)/N = α for some α ∈ (0, 1], k∗(N) can be approximated by
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αN for N large enough. So,
lim
N→∞
ΠTea(x[N ])
N
= lim
N→∞
N−1∑
k=dαNe
x[N ](k)
[
pN−1(k)A+ pN−1(k − 1)B] .
where dαNe denotes the least integer greater than or equal to αN for every N .
Moreover, for any N large enough and any integer k, if dαNe ≤ k ≤ N − 1, there
exists βk,N ∈ (0, 1) such that k is approximated by βk,NN . We thus obtain that for
N large enough,
βk,NN
βk,NN − 1 ≈ 1.
We also know that as N → ∞, pN−1(k) can be approximated by fN−1(k), which is
the probability density function of the normal distribution with mean (N − 1)(1− ε)
and variance (N − 1)(1 − ε)ε. This approximation is formally called De Moivre-
Laplace theorem. See, for example, Athanasios (1991) for the details. Since fN−1(·)
is continuous, for any N large enough and any integer k, if dαNe ≤ k ≤ N − 1,
fN−1(βk,NN) ≈ fN−1(βk,NN − 1).
This implies that for any integer k and N , if k∗(N) ≤ k ≤ N − 1,
lim
N→∞
pN−1(k) = lim
N→∞
pN−1(k − 1).
In other words, the difference in the binomial probabilities of k and (k−1) is negligible
in large economies. We thus replace pN−1(k − 1) by pN−1(k) in the expression of
limN→∞ΠTea(x[N ])/N and rewrite it as follows:
lim
N→∞
ΠTea(x[N ])
N
= lim
N→∞
N−1∑
k=k∗(N)
x[N ](k)
[
pN−1(k)A+ pN−1(k)B
]
= lim
N→∞
N−1∑
k=k∗(N)
pN−1(k)x[N ](k)(A+B)
= (A+B) lim
N→∞
N−1∑
k=k∗(N)
pN−1(k)x[N ](k)
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Moreover, for N large enough, we have N/(N−1) ≈ 1 so that we can replace (N−1)
by N and rewrite the expression of ΠTea(x[N ])/N as follows:
lim
N→∞
ΠTea(x[N ])
N
= (A+B) lim
N→∞
N∑
k=k∗(N)
pN(k)x[N ](k),
where pN(k) is the probability that k out of N agents are of type θ2. Recall that
A + B = −(−A − B) < 0. Since {x[N ]}N is a sequence of mechanisms satisfying
BIC, IIR, and BB, by Proposition 2, we must have ΠTea(x[N ]) ≥ 0 for each N . This
together with Assumption 1 implies that we obtain the following equivalence:
lim
N→∞
ΠTea(x[N ])/N ≥ 0
if and only if
lim
N→∞
N∑
k=1
pN(k)x[N ](k) = 0.
This concludes that the ex ante probability that the public good is provided converges
to zero as the population size of the economy gets large.
5 Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibility and
Ex Post Individual Rationality
Now, let us replace the Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC) and interim indi-
vidual rationality (IIR) constraints with dominant strategy incentive compatibility
(DSIC) and ex post individual rationality (EPIR) constraints, respectively. We then
investigate the existence of mechanisms satisfying DSIC, EPIR, EFF, and BB. In
this case, we could make any distributional assumption about the type space and in
particular, we could allow for any correlation among types.
Suppose there are N ≥ 2 agents in the economy and each agent has M ≥ 2 types
0 < θ1 < · · · < θM . We also assume that the cost of providing the public good c(N)
is an increasing function in N and Nθ1 < c(N) ≤ (N − 1)θM . Recall the decision
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efficient rule x∗(·): for any θ ∈ ΘN ,
x∗(θ) =
{
1 if
∑
i∈N θi ≥ c(N),
0 otherwise.
In order to satisfy BB, we assume that for every type profile θ ∈ ΘN and decision
rule x,
tN(θ) = x(θ) · c(N)−
∑
i 6=N
ti(θ).
Proposition 3. Assume that Nθ1 < c(N) ≤ (N − 1)θM . Then, there are no
mechanisms satisfying DSIC, EPIR, EFF, and BB.
Remark: This is considered as a dominant strategy counterpart of our Theorem
2, which shows that there are no mechanisms satisfying BIC, IIR, EFF, and BB in
large economies. Although DSIC and EPIR each are stronger than BIC and IIR,
respectively, we establish here the negative result even if we make no assumption
over types and do not appeal to the power of large economies. Theorem 7 of Green
and Laffont (1977) shows a similar negative result in a rich environment with a
continuum type space where the agents might have non-quasilinear preferences.
Proof. Consider the profile θ¯ where θ¯i = θ
M for every i ∈ N . Since c(N) ≤ (N−1)θM ,
then x∗(θ¯) = x∗(θ1, θ¯−i) = 1. By DSIC, for each agent i ∈ N , we have
θM · 1− ti(θ¯) ≥ θM · 1− ti(θ1, θ¯−i)⇒ ti(θ¯) ≤ ti(θ1, θ¯−i)
and
θ1 · 1− ti(θ1, θ¯−i) ≥ θ1 · 1− ti(θ¯)⇒ ti(θ1, θ¯−i) ≤ ti(θ¯).
Combining the above two inequalities, we obtain that for each agent i ∈ N , ti(θ¯) =
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ti(θ
1, θ¯−i). In particular, for agent N , we have
tN(θ¯) =tN(θ
1, θ¯−N)
⇒ c(N)−
∑
i 6=N
ti(θ¯) =c(N)−
∑
i 6=N
ti(θ
1, θ¯−N) (∵ BB)
⇒
∑
i 6=N
ti(θ¯) =
∑
i 6=N
ti(θ
1, θ¯−N)
⇒
∑
i 6=N
ti(θ
1, θ¯−i) =
∑
i 6=N
ti(θ
1, θ¯−N) (∵ ti(θ¯) = ti(θ1, θ¯−i) for each agent i) (9)
Note that on the left-hand side of (9), ti(θ
1, θ¯−i) denotes the payment of agent i 6= N
if he unilaterally deviates from the profile θ¯ and reports θ1; on the right-hand side of
(9), ti(θ
1, θ¯−N) denotes the payment of agent i 6= N if agent N unilaterally deviates
from the profile θ¯ and reports θ1.
For each agent i ∈ N under the profile (θ1, θ¯−i), EPIR requires θ1 ·1−ti(θ1, θ¯−i) ≥
0, which is equivalent to ti(θ
1, θ¯−i) ≤ θ1. So, the left-hand side of (9) must be smaller
than or equal to (N − 1)θ1. Also, for agent N , we have
θ1 · 1− tN(θ1, θ¯−N) ≥ 0
⇒ θ1 · 1− (c(N)−
∑
i 6=N
ti(θ
1, θ¯−N)) ≥ 0 (∵ BB)
⇒
∑
i 6=N
ti(θ
1, θ¯−N) ≥ c(N)− θ1
Using (9), we summarize some of the inequalities thus obtained below:
(N − 1)θ1 ≥
∑
i 6=N
ti(θ
1, θ¯−i) =︸︷︷︸
(9)
∑
i 6=N
ti(θ
1, θ¯−N) ≥ c(N)− θ1.
We thus obtain Nθ1 ≥ c(N), which contradicts the assumption that c(N) > Nθ1 for
any N .
Hence, in all nontrivial cases, we have no hope in finding mechanisms satisfying
DSIC, EPIR, EFF, and BB simultaneously, even if we focus on two-type and small
finite agent economies. Thus, we are left with the trivial cases: (i) c(N) = Nθ1 or
(ii) c(N) = NθM .
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Proposition 4. Suppose that either (i) c(N) = Nθ1 or (ii) c(N) = NθM holds. In
both cases, there exists a mechanism satisfying DSIC, EPIR, EFF, and BB.
Proof. Suppose that (i) c(N) = Nθ1. Then for any θ ∈ ΘN ,
x∗(θ) = 1
and
ti(θ) = c(N)/N for any i ∈ N .
Suppose that (ii) c(N) = NθM . Then for any θ ∈ ΘN ,
x∗(θ) =
1 if all agents are of type θM0 otherwise
and for any i ∈ N ,
t∗i (θ) =
c(N)/N if x∗(θ) = 10 otherwise
Clearly, these two mechanisms satisfy DSIC, EPIR, EFF, and BB in each case,
respectively.
6 Concluding Remark
This paper characterizes mechanisms satisfying BIC, IIR, BB, and/or EFF for public
good production and cost decision in a finite-type environment with risk-neutral,
quasilinear preferences, and fixed-size projects. The main contribution of this paper
is to undercover the structure of public good provision mechanisms in a discrete
environment and make a coherent comparison with many papers in the literature
which deal with the continuum type space. In our discrete setup, we restore many
known results of the classic public good provision problem within the standard model.
Overall, this paper shows that even in a finite type environment, “positive results”
exist only in very small economies. This is largely consistent with the literature which
usually assumes a continuum type space. In particular, we show that a mechanism
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satisfying BIC, IIR, EFF, and BB exists only in very small economies and as the
size of the economy gets large, the probability that the public good is provided con-
verges to zero in any mechanism satisfying BIC, IIR, and BB. We thus establish the
robustness of the overly negative implications in the classical public good provision
problem.
Our results in large economies might even suggest the necessity of mandatory
payment of taxes as opposed to voluntary contribution. On the other hand, if we were
to maintain the individual rationality constraints but look for more positive results,
we believe that we must propose a meaningful and operationally useful relaxation of
the incentive compatibility constraints. If we take this route, we do not necessarily
impose incentive compatibility on the mechanisms. Hence, we can no longer appeal
to the revelation principle. This is a direction we also want to take for our further
research.
7 Appendix
In the Appendix, we provide all the proofs which are omitted from the main body
of the paper.
7.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Fix i ∈ N and θm, θn ∈ Θ arbitrarily. By definition, we obtain
x¯∗i (θ
m) =
∑
θ−i∈ΘN−1
PN−1(θ−i)x∗(θm, θ−i) =
∑
θ−i:
∑
j 6=i θj≥c(N)−θm
PN−1(θ−i);
x¯∗i (θ
n) =
∑
θ−i∈ΘN−1
PN−1(θ−i)x∗(θn, θ−i) =
∑
θ−i:
∑
j 6=i θj≥c(N)−θn
PN−1(θ−i).
Observe that as N →∞,
lim
N→∞
(c(N)/N − θm/N) = lim
N→∞
(c(N)/N − θn/N) = lim
N→∞
c(N)/N.
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because θ1 < limN→∞ c(N)/N < θM . For each θm ∈ Θ and N ≥ 2, we have{
θ−i ∈ ΘN−1
∣∣∣ ∑
j 6=i
θj ≥ c(N)− θm
}
=
{
θ−i ∈ ΘN−1
∣∣∣ 1
N
∑
j 6=i
θj ≥ c(N)/N − θm/N
}
Therefore, for each θm ∈ Θ, as N →∞,∑
θ−i:
∑
j 6=i θj≥c(N)−θm
PN−1(θ−i) ≈
∑
θ−i: 1N (
∑
j 6=i θj)≥c(N)/N
PN−1(θ−i),
which does not depend on θm. This implies limN→∞ x¯∗i (θ
m) = limN→∞ x¯∗i (θ
n).
7.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. For the ease of notation, we define
ΘN∗ ≡
{
θ ∈ ΘN :
∑
i∈N
θi ≥ c(N)
}
and for each θi ∈ Θ,
ΘN−1∗ (θi) ≡
{
θ−i ∈ ΘN−1 :
∑
j 6=i
θj ≥ c(N)− θi
}
.
Then we obtain the desired expression in Lemma 2 as follows:
LHS = lim
N→∞
∑
θ∈ΘN
PN(θ)x∗[N ](θ)
= lim
N→∞
∑
θ∈ΘN∗
PN(θ) ( recall the definition of x¯∗(θ))
= lim
N→∞
∑
θi∈Θ
∑
θ−i∈ΘN−1∗ (θi)
P (θi)P
N−1(θ−i) (∵ types are independently distributed )
= lim
N→∞
∑
θi∈Θ
P (θi)x¯
∗
i [N ](θi)
∵ x¯i∗[N ](θi) = ∑
θ−i∈ΘN−1∗
PN−1(θ−i)

= lim
N→∞
x¯∗i [N ](θ
M)
∑
θi∈Θ
P (θi)
(
∵ lim
N→∞
x¯∗i [N ](θ
m) = lim
N→∞
x¯∗i [N ](θ
n) for any m 6= n by Lemma 1
)
= lim
N→∞
x¯∗i [N ](θ
M) = RHS
(
∵
∑
θi∈Θ
P (θi) = 1
)
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7.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. We take the expression of Π′ea(x
∗) from Proposition 1:
Π′ea(x
∗) =
M−1∑
m=1
x¯∗i (θ
m)
(
Nθm
M∑
l=m
P (θl)−Nθm+1
M∑
l=m+1
P (θl)− c(N)P (θm)
)
+ x¯∗i (θ
M)
(
NθM − c(N))P (θM).
In particular, when M = 2,
Π′ea(x
∗) = x¯∗i (θ
1)
(
Nθ1
2∑
l=1
P (θl)−Nθ2P (θ2)− c(N)P (θ1)
)
+ x¯∗i (θ
2)
(
Nθ2 − c(N))P (θ2)
= x¯∗i (θ
1)
(
Nθ1 − (1− ε)Nθ2 − εc(N))+ x¯∗i (θ2)(1− ε) (Nθ2 − c(N))
=
N−1∑
k=k∗
pN−1(k)
(
Nθ1 − (1− ε)Nθ2 − εc(N))+ N−1∑
k=k∗−1
pN−1(k)(1− ε) (Nθ2 − c(N))
( recall the formulas of x¯∗i (θ
1) and x¯∗i (θ
2))
=
N−1∑
k=k∗
pN−1(k)
(
Nθ1 − (1− ε)Nθ2 − εc(N) + (1− ε)Nθ2 − (1− ε)c(N)
)
+pN−1(k∗ − 1)(1− ε) (Nθ2 − c(N))
=
N−1∑
k=k∗
pN−1(k)
(
Nθ1 − c(N))+ pN−1(k∗ − 1)(1− ε) (Nθ2 − c(N))
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We know that (k∗(N)− 1)θ2 + (N − k∗(N) + 1)θ1 < c(N). Plugging this inequality
in Π
′
ea(x
∗), we obtain
Π′ea(x
∗) <
(
Nθ1 − (k∗(N)− 1)θ2 − (N − k∗(N) + 1)θ1) N−1∑
k=k∗(N)
pN−1(k)
+ (1− ε)(Nθ2 − (k∗(N)− 1)θ2 − (N − k∗(N) + 1)θ1) · pN−1(k∗(N)− 1)
=− (k∗(N)− 1)(θ2 − θ1)
N−1∑
k=k∗(N)
pN−1(k) + (1− ε)(N − k∗(N) + 1)(θ2 − θ1)pN−1(k∗(N)− 1)
=(θ2 − θ1)
−(k∗(N)− 1) N−1∑
k=k∗(N)
pN−1(k) + (1− ε)(N − k∗(N) + 1)pN−1(k∗(N)− 1)

Defining
Π¯ea(x
∗) ≡ −(k∗(N)− 1)
N−1∑
k=k∗(N)
pN−1(k) + (1− ε)(N − k∗(N) + 1)pN−1(k∗(N)− 1),
we rewrite the expression for the upper bound of Π
′
ea(x
∗) as follows:
Π′ea(x
∗) < (θ2 − θ1)Π¯ea(x∗).
7.4 Proof of the Assertion in Footnote 12
Proof. Recall that x∗[N ] is the efficient decision rule in an economy with N agents.
In this example,
lim
N→∞
∑
θ∈ΘN
PN(θ)x∗[N ](θ) = lim
N→∞
N∑
k=k∗(N)
pN(k)
where pN(k) is the probability that k out of N agents are of type θ2.
Moreover, as N →∞, pN(k) can be approximated by fN(k), which is the prob-
ability density function of the normal distribution with mean N(1− ε) and variance
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N(1− ε)ε. This approximation is formally called De Moivre-Laplace theorem. See,
for example, Athanasios (1991) for the details. Therefore,
lim
N→∞
∑
θ∈ΘN
PN(θ)x∗[N ](θ) = lim
N→∞
N∑
k=k∗(N)
pN(k) = lim
N→∞
∫ N
k∗(N)
fN(k)dk > 0
because k∗(N) = d(1− ε)Ne, which is the mean of the approximated normal distri-
bution. Hence, Theorem 2 applies so that we obtain limN→∞Π′ea(x
∗[N ])/N < 0.
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